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On January 1, 1999, the European Union
(EU) launched what will surely be one of the
most ambitious political and economic under-
takings of the twenty-first century: economic
and monetary union (EMU), incorporating eleven
of the fifteen current members of the EU. A new
currency, the euro, replaced the national cur-
rencies of the eleven countries,
1 and a new insti-
tution, the European Central Bank (ECB), took
over responsibility for monetary policy for the
euro area. Many commentators in the United
States thought EMU would never take place or,
if it did, that it would not last very long. The
successful launch of EMU was thus a surprise in
some quarters, and some of the skeptics have
been forced to reevaluate their positions. EMU
is now one year old, and it seems appropriate
to review what has happened during the first
year and assess the prospects for the future.
Over the course of 1999, the euro depre-
ciated steadily against the dollar. The ECB made
its first rate moves, lowering interest rates in April
in response to deflation risk in the euro area
and raising them in November as the recovery
took hold and the inflation outlook deterio-
rated. The ECB successfully defended its inde-
pendence against challenges from the finance
minister of one of the larger member states and
has worked to establish credibility for its com-
mitment to price stability. The TARGET pay-
ments system, key to the integration of euro
area money markets, came online and has 
operated without any major problems. The euro
has emerged as an important international cur-
rency, second only to the dollar. The volume of
international bonds denominated in euros
exceeded dollar-denominated issuance during
1999. The four EU countries that currently do
not participate in EMU all moved closer to even-
tual membership. However, there were few
moves toward the fiscal, labor, and product 
market reforms that may ultimately determine
the fate of EMU.
MAIN DEVELOPMENTS DURING 1999
The euro officially became the currency of
the eleven participating nations on January 1,
1999. The rates to be used for converting
national currency units into euros were
announced on December 31, 1998. During the
changeover weekend, January 1 through
January 3, the financial community had to
reconfigure computer and accounting systems
to handle the new currency. Furthermore, all
government debt of the euro-area countries was
redenominated in euros, as were the share prices
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of all companies listed in the euro area, along
with millions of bank accounts.
The most striking and oft analyzed devel-
opment during 1999 was the steady deprecia-
tion of the euro against the dollar. The euro also
declined against the yen and the pound sterling.
When the euro made its debut on world finan-
cial markets on January 4, 1999, it was trading
at $1.18. It immediately began to depreciate
against the dollar, coming close to parity (and
briefly below in intraday trading) by December
1999 (Figure 1).
2 The depreciation took many
commentators by surprise and was contrary to
the confident predictions of many that the euro
would rapidly appreciate against the dollar,
given the relative current account positions of
the United States and the euro area.
However, if we take a longer-term per-
spective, the decline of the euro against the dol-
lar over the past year is less remarkable. Figure
2 shows the exchange rate of the euro’s prede-
cessor, the European Currency Unit (ECU),
against the dollar from 1996 through 1998,
along with the exchange rate of the euro against
the dollar during 1999.
3 Under the terms of the
transition to EMU, one ECU was required to
equal one euro at midnight December 31, 1998.
As Figure 2 shows, in late 1998, the ECU, or
rather the legacy currencies of the euro, experi-
enced a strong appreciation against the dollar in
the wake of Russia’s default and the failure of
the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management
in the United States. Some of this appreciation
may also have been driven by the “europhoria”
in the period between the Brussels summit in
May 1998—at which the EU heads of govern-
ment decided which countries would participate
in EMU—and the actual launch of EMU.
Perhaps more important for the evolution
of the dollar–euro exchange rate was the fact
that over the course of 1999 the U.S. economy
continued to grow at a robust pace, while the
euro area experienced a growth recession.
Through the third quarter, GDP increased only
2.3 percent in the euro area, and in autumn
1999 the European Commission forecast an
increase of only 2.1 percent for the year as a
whole. Unemployment in the euro area re-
mained stubbornly high, declining from 10.6
percent of the labor force in December 1998 to
9.6 percent at the end of 1999. Evidence
strengthened that trend productivity growth was
accelerating in the United States, but there were
few signs that much-needed structural reforms
were being undertaken in Europe.
It is too early to take the decline as symp-
tomatic of fundamental problems with the new
currency. Over the long run, the nominal
exchange rate of the euro against the dollar will
reflect the relative success of the ECB in main-
taining the euro’s purchasing power, but over
the short run, cyclical and other factors will be
more important.
The ECB made its first rate moves in 1999,
lowering its repo rate from 3 percent to 2.5 per-
cent in April and then raising it back to 3 per-
cent in November.
4 It is significant that in nei-
ther case was there much political opposition
from the countries most likely to have opposed
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the last thing the rapidly growing economies on
the fringe of the euro area (Ireland, Finland,
Spain and Portugal) needed. Indeed, Ireland,
which has come to be known as the “Celtic
Tiger,” seems to be exhibiting the symptoms of
a classic asset price bubble, with house prices
rising by as much as 20 percent to 30 percent a
year. Likewise, when it came time to raise rates
in November, the sluggish German economy
probably could have benefited from a longer
period of lower interest rates. However, the
ECB’s mandate is to maintain price stability in
the euro area as a whole. Thus, it has explained
its decisions to raise or lower interest rates on
the basis of developments at the euro-area level
rather than in terms of what has happened in
individual member states.
5
THE CHALLENGE OF CONDUCTING MONETARY
POLICY FOR THE EURO AREA
One of the most important tasks prior to
EMU was to ensure that the ECB would have at
its disposal adequate statistical information to
make monetary policy decisions for the euro
area. This required some degree of harmoniza-
tion of statistical practices across the EU, in par-
ticular for inflation and monetary statistics.
Primary responsibility for the production of offi-
cial statistics in the EU rests with Eurostat, which
is one of the Directorates General of the Euro-
pean Commission. Eurostat produces statistics
for the euro area and the member states in con-
junction with national statistical institutes and
plays a key role in ensuring that statistics are
harmonized. GDP estimates for the euro area
are constructed on a consistent basis using the
ESA95 version of the European System of
Accounts (ESA). Unemployment rates for the
euro area are calculated using a definition put
forward by the International Labour Office in
1982.
6
The ECB defined price stability in terms of
the rate of increase in the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area. The
HICP program originated in the need for a com-
mon measure of inflation to assess EMU mem-
bership candidates’ compliance with the con-
vergence criteria stipulated in the treaty.  The
various national consumer price indexes (CPIs)
differ significantly in their concept and cover-
age. According to the European Commission
(1998), as much as 13 percent of expenditures
covered by the HICP are excluded from some
national CPIs, while as much as 17 percent of
expenditures covered by some national CPIs are
excluded from the HICP. The HICP differs from
the U.S. CPI, for example, beginning with the
pricing concept. While the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics uses the theory of the cost of living
index as the framework for constructing the U.S.
CPI (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1997), the
HICP uses “household final monetary consump-
tion,” which means that only the prices paid in
monetary transactions are included. The HICP
does not, therefore, include the imputed costs
of agricultural products grown for personal con-
sumption or the services of owner-occupied
dwellings. The latter is included in the U.S. CPI
and accounts for approximately one-fifth of the
basket.
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A more serious problem from the ECB’s
perspective is that the HICP program only
began in 1997. Aggregate HICP data are avail-
able for a slightly longer period, but the fact
remains that the ECB must work with price sta-
tistics for which there are a limited number 
of observations. Even if a long time series on
prices were available, it is not clear how useful
it would be to the ECB. Since Lucas (1976),
economists have been sensitive to the instability
of estimated empirical relationships in the face of
policy regime changes. While there is some
debate in macroeconomics as to what exactly
constitutes a regime change, few would deny
that EMU is a major change in the monetary pol-
icy regime for all the participating countries.
PRICE STABILITY
Article 105 (1) of the Maastricht Treaty
states that the primary objective of the ECB shall
be to maintain price stability but leaves it to the
ECB to define what exactly, in terms of mea-
sured inflation, constitutes price stability. Prior
to EMU, the ECB announced that it would
define price stability as a “year-on-year increase
in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
(HICP) for the euro area of below 2%.”
Furthermore, price stability is to be maintained
“over the medium term.”
8 At the launch of EMU,
HICP inflation in the euro area was running at
an annual rate of about 1 percent, having
slowed from rates in excess of 2 percent in early
1996. An energy price deceleration in 1997 and
decline in 1998 contributed significantly to the
favorable inflation situation at the launch of
EMU. However, as Figure 3 shows, during 1999
the inflation rate accelerated as energy prices
started to increase and the euro declined against
the dollar and other major currencies.
Furthermore, there has been some diver-
gence of inflation rates across the euro area
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lowest inflation rates across the eleven euro
area countries, along with the limit set down in
the Maastricht Treaty.
9 Since mid-1998, inflation
in Portugal, Spain, and Ireland has exceeded the
limit set down in the treaty, although as of
December 1999 only Ireland’s inflation rate  was
more than 1.5 percentage points above the
average of the three lowest. The ECB does not
yet include a measure of core inflation for the
euro area in the statistical appendix to its
Monthly Bulletin, although Eurostat, the EU’s
statistical agency, does include a core measure
(“All items excluding energy, food, alcohol, and
tobacco”) on its web site.
10
THE REFERENCE VALUE FOR M3
The twin pillars of the ECB’s monetary
policy strategy are a reference value for the
growth rate of the broad money aggregate M3
and a broadly based assessment of the outlook
for future price developments and the risks to
price stability in the euro area. The choice of M3
rather than a narrower aggregate was based on
research indicating the M3 aggregate has desir-
able characteristics in terms of stability and
information about future inflation.
11
The reference value for M3 is derived from
three assumptions:
1. Price stability is defined as a rate of
increase in the HICP of 2 percent or less.
2. The trend rate of growth of real GDP 
in the euro area is 2 percent to 2.5
percent.
3. The trend rate of decline in M3 velocity
is about 0.5 percent to 1 percent a 
year.
These three assumptions, together with a
standard quantity theory view of the determina-
tion of the price level, led the Governing
Council to choose a reference value of 4.5 per-
cent for M3 growth during 1999.
12 The monthly
statistics on M3 growth are assessed in relation
to this reference value using a centered three-
month moving average of monthly growth rates.
It should be noted that the ECB’s derivation of
the reference value for the euro area’s M3
aggregate is similar to the Bundesbank’s proce-
dure to derive its annual M3 target (see
Deutsche Bundesbank 1995).
As Figure 5 shows, M3 growth drifted
steadily away from its reference over the course
of the year. As of December 1999, M3 growth
was almost 2 percentage points above the refer-
ence value. The ECB discounted some of the
deviation as due to temporary factors associated
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to raise interest rates aggressively in response to
the deviation suggests that it may take a prag-
matic view of the reference value for M3, much
as the Bundesbank did of its M3 target. From
the time the Bundesbank set its first monetary
target (in 1974) until the start of EMU, it suc-




One criticism levied against the ECB dur-
ing its first year is that it is not sufficiently trans-
parent in making monetary policy decisions 
and is not held adequately accountable for
those decisions (see, for example, Buiter 1999
and Begg et al. 1998). The critics argue that 
the ECB should publish the minutes of
Governing Council meetings, the votes of indi-
vidual council members, and the reasoning and
forecasts that underlie council decisions. The
ECB has resisted publication of minutes and
votes, arguing that making such information
public would increase pressure on council
members to vote along national lines rather than
in the interests of the euro area as a whole (see
Issing 1999).
Transparency in monetary policymaking
has many dimensions, and much of the criticism
of the ECB seems unwarranted. Table 1 com-
pares practices of the ECB, the Federal Reserve
System, and the Bank of England as they relate
to transparency and accountability. The policy-
making committee of the ECB—the Governing
Council—meets much more frequently than the
Federal Reserve System’s Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) or the Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). Through
1999 the ECB’s Governing Council met every
two weeks (except during August) at the ECB’s
headquarters in Frankfurt, although the
Maastricht Treaty requires only that it meet at
least ten times a year (Protocol No. 3 on the
Statute of the European System of Central Banks
and the European Central Bank, Article 10.5). A
press conference was held after the first of the
two meetings in each month, and the tradition
seems to be evolving that rate moves are only
made at the meetings that are followed 
by a press conference. At the press conference 
the president of the ECB summarizes recent
economic developments, then he and the vice
president hold a question-and-answer session
with journalists. The opening statement and the
Q&A are posted on the ECB’s web site
(http://www.ecb.int) within hours. The ECB
views the press conference, along with the edi-
torial that appears in each issue of its Monthly
Bulletin, as a substitute for the publication of
minutes. (Neither the FOMC nor the MPC holds
a press conference after its meetings.) Trans-
parency is a slippery concept, and there is no
meaningful way to evaluate whether a press
conference following a policy decision consti-
tutes more or less transparency than the publi-
cation of votes and minutes.
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The second issue concerns the publication
of forecasts. The Bank of England has been an
innovator in this regard, publishing on a regular
basis its inflation forecast and not just a point
forecast. The FOMC does not publish forecasts
(although the chairman does report the range of
forecasts of committee members in his twice-
yearly Humphrey–Hawkins testimony).
Article 109b.3 of the Maastricht Treaty
requires that
The ECB shall address an annual report on
the activities of the ESCB [European System
Monetary Aggregates for the Euro Area
Before EMU, each of the EU member states constructed monetary aggregates
using national definitions that differed across countries. It was not possible to arrive
at a consistent aggregate for the euro area by simply adding together these differing
national aggregates.Thus, a key challenge prior to EMU’s launch was to harmonize
definitions to allow consistent measures to be constructed for the single currency
area. As part of this harmonization process, the European Monetary Institute and the
national central banks developed the concept of a Monetary Financial Institution
(MFI), consisting of three types.The first is central banks.The second is resident
credit institutions as defined by EU law, and the third is “all other resident financial
institutions whose business is to receive deposits and/or close substitutes for
deposits from entities other than MFIs and, for their own account…to grant credits
and/or to make investments in securities.” This third category consists primarily of
money market funds.
The main broad monetary aggregates for the euro area are defined below.The
M1 aggregate consists of currency in circulation and overnight deposits and differs
little from the old national definitions of M1.The category overnight deposits includes
balances on prepaid cards in those countries where prepaid card schemes exist. M2
adds to M1 deposits with agreed maturity up to two years and deposits redeemable
at notice up to three months.The M3 aggregate adds to M2 repurchase agreements,
liabilities of money market funds and debt securities up to two years. Note that prior
to EMU, repurchase agreements were excluded from the national definitions of mon-
etary aggregates in France and Italy, while money market fund shares/units were
included only in the national monetary aggregates of France. For further information
on the new euro-area aggregates and how they relate to old national definitions, see
European Central Bank (1999b).
Definitions of Euro-Area Monetary Aggregates
M1 M2 M3
Currency in circulation ✔✔ ✔
Overnight deposits ✔✔ ✔
Deposits with agreed maturity up to two years ✔✔
Deposits redeemable at notice up to three months ✔✔
Repurchase agreements ✔
Money market fund shares/units and money market paper ✔
Debt securities up to two years ✔
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of Central Banks] and on the monetary pol-
icy of both the previous and current year
to the European Parliament, the Council
and the Commission, and also to the
European Council. The President of the
ECB shall present this report to the Council
and to the European Parliament, which
may hold a general debate on that basis.
The ECB submitted its first annual report
in April 1999, and the European Parliament’s
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs
reviewed it. In its response, the committee
called for greater transparency from the ECB
(see European Parliament 1999). Specifically,
the committee noted that it
7. Regrets that the ECB has fallen short of
the transparency practiced by other lead-
ing central banks; notes that the U.S.
Federal Reserve Board [sic], Bank of Japan,
Bank of England and Swedish Riksbank
now report both sides of arguments about
monetary actions; and calls for summary
minutes taken at meetings of the ECB
Governing Council to be published shortly
after the following meeting reporting
explicitly the arguments for and against
the decisions taken, as well as the reason-
ing used in reaching these decisions;
8. Calls on the ECB to publish macro-
economic forecasts on a six-monthly basis
which set out the prospects and the risks
attached to those prospects for: domestic
demand and its principal components, net
exports, nominal and real gross domestic
product, consumer price inflation, unem-
ployment and the current account balance,
together with such relevant data and re-
search on which such forecasts are based,
in order to permit a reliable assessment of
monetary decisions, avoid market misin-
formation, ensure market transparency and
hence counter speculation;
9. Calls on the ECB to publish a regular
overall report of economic developments
in each of the participating euro-area
countries together with a summary of the
national data which will facilitate compari-
sons of best practice; enable early warn-
ings of potential problems within the euro-
area which might require policy action 
by respective governments; and inform
national wage bargainers of sustainable
earnings developments given their own
productivity, price and competitiveness
trends.…
At the subsequent hearings the ECB presi-
dent acceded to the request to publish forecasts
and promised they would be published during
2000, along with the economic models used to
produce these forecasts. However, he rejected
the request that the ECB publish summary min-
utes, arguing as before that the information the
ECB provided at its press conferences and in its
Monthly Bulletin came “very close in substance
to the publication of summary minutes.” He also
rejected calls for reports on each euro-area
country, arguing that the production of such
reports would impede the development of a
euro-area perspective. The Committee on Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs called for publica-
tion of votes on monetary policy actions after a
two-year delay, but this proposal was rejected
when put to a vote of the full European Parlia-
ment.
Concerns about the ECB’s accountability
to the European electorate have two dimen-
sions. The first is whether the provisions of the
Maastricht Treaty that require the ECB to report
to the European Parliament satisfy the need of
accountability in a democratic society. The sec-
ond is whether the European Parliament has the
stature to represent the European electorate’s
concerns. Regarding the latter, two significant
developments took place during 1999. In
March, the Parliament for the first time forced
the resignation of the European Commission
over allegations of financial misconduct,
thereby enhancing the Parliament’s standing
among EU institutions and its authority as the
representative body of the EU electorate. And
on May 1, the Amsterdam Treaty entered into
Table 1
Transparency in Monetary Policymaking at the 
Federal Reserve, the ECB, and the Bank of England
Federal Reserve Bank of
ECB System England
Policymaking committee Governing Federal Open Monetary Policy
Council Market Committee Committee
Frequency of meeting Every two weeks Every six or Every month
seven weeks
Announced strategy Yes No Yes
Quantitative definition of Yes No Yes
price stability
Publication of forecasts Not yet No Yes
Publication of minutes No Yes Yes
Publication of votes No Yes Yes
Press conference Yes No No
Accountable to elected body Yes Yes Yes
SOURCES: European Central Bank, Federal Reserve System, Bank of England.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 20
force, substantially extending the right of co-
decision of the European Parliament, making it
the council’s legislative equal in many areas.
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EMERGENCE OF THE EURO 
AS AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY
Prior to the euro’s launch, there was much
discussion about the extent to which it would
compete with or even displace the dollar as 
the world’s most important international cur-
rency. Some argued it would take a long time
for the euro to replace the dollar in international
transactions because of network effects. (I find
it more useful to conduct transactions 
in dollars when more of my trading and invest-
ment partners also conduct transactions in 
dollars). Others argued that EMU itself was a
shock of sufficient magnitude to trigger rapid
adoption of the euro (see, in particular, Portes
and Rey 1998).
The ECB has stated repeatedly that “inter-
nationalisation of the euro…is not a policy
objective…[and] will be neither fostered nor
hindered by the Eurosystem.” Table 2 lists the
main functions of international currencies, using
the traditional classification of the functions of
money (see Cohen 1971 and Hartmann 1998).
The U.S. dollar is used to quote prices for indus-
trial commodities, and many countries maintain
some type of currency peg to the dollar. There
are significant holdings of U.S. dollars in coun-
tries that have experienced high inflation, while
foreign central banks typically use dollars to
intervene in foreign exchange markets to sup-
port their local currency. Until last year the dol-
lar was the currency of choice for international
bond issuance, and most central banks continue
to hold the bulk of their foreign exchange
reserves in dollar-denominated assets.
Since the introduction of the euro, most
commodity prices continue to be quoted in dol-
lars, but large European firms now use the euro
for quotation purposes. For instance, Airbus no
longer uses the dollar to quote aircraft prices. As
of the end of 1999, three countries (Estonia,
Bulgaria, and Bosnia–Herzegovina) were pegging
their currencies to the euro through currency
board arrangements. A larger group of countries
(Cyprus, Macedonia, Cape Verde, Comoros, and
the fourteen countries of the West African
Colonies Françaises d’Afrique [CFA] zone) had
more traditional fixed exchange rate pegs to the
euro. Denmark and Greece are also pegged to
the euro, albeit under a cooperative arrange-
ment under the terms of ERM II, the successor
to the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the
European Monetary System.
15 A third group
(Croatia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak
Republic, and Slovenia) has managed floats vis-
à-vis the euro. A fourth group (Hungary,
Iceland, Malta, Poland, Turkey, Bangladesh,
Botswana, Burundi, Chile, Israel, and the
Seychelles) has either fixed or crawling pegs to
baskets of currencies that include the euro.
Finally, a fifth group of countries pegs to the
Special Drawing Right (SDR) issued by the
International Monetary Fund in which the euro
has a weight of about one quarter. (The other
currencies in the SDR basket are the U.S. dollar,
the Japanese yen, and the pound sterling).
Perhaps the most significant benefit to the
EU from internationalization of the euro would
be the seigniorage revenue it would earn from
foreign demand for euros. Although euro notes
and coins will not be introduced until 2002, it is
worth considering the revenue this may gener-
ate. At the end of 1999, approximately $600 bil-
lion of U.S. currency was in circulation.
According to Porter and Judson (1996), more
than half the stock of U.S. currency—and pos-
sibly as much as 70 percent—was held outside
the United States at the end of 1995. If we
choose a conservative estimate of 50 percent
and assume that absent these foreign holdings
the federal government would have to issue an
equivalent amount of short-term debt at the
then-prevailing interest rate of 5.3 percent, the
flow of seigniorage to the U.S. Treasury from
the foreign holdings was about $15.6 billion (=
$600 billion × 50 percent × 5.3 percent). As of
November 1999, there was approximately €330
billion of currency outstanding in the euro area.
Since euro notes and coins have not yet been
introduced, this total consists of the notes and
coins of the ten legacy currencies (Luxembourg
was in a monetary union with Belgium prior to
EMU). It is unlikely that many of the legacy cur-
rencies circulated to a significant extent beyond
their national borders, with the exception of the
Deutsche mark. Seitz (1995) estimates that
approximately 40 percent of the stock of
Deutsche marks circulates outside Germany. In
November 1999, Deutsche mark notes and coins
Table 2
Functions of International Currencies
Private use Official use
Unit of account Pricing/quotation currency Pegging currency
Medium of exchange Payment/vehicle currency Intervention currency
In exchanges of goods and services
In currency exchange
Store of value Investment/financing currency Reserve currency
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in circulation amounted to €126 billion, or about
38 percent of the euro-area total. Thus, the esti-
mated seigniorage revenue currently accruing to
the euro area (specifically, to Germany) from
non-euro-area holdings of Deutsche marks
amounts to about €2 billion a year (= €126 bil-
lion × 40 percent × 4 percent, using the interest
rate on two-year euro-area government bonds
as of November 1999 as an estimate of what the
government would have to pay to raise the
funds by borrowing).
16 This probably constitutes
a lower bound on the amount of seigniorage
the EU will earn from non-EU holdings of the
euro once the notes and coins are introduced.
The euro’s domestic habitat is significantly
larger in economic terms than that of the
Deutsche mark, making the euro more attractive
to non-EU residents than the Deutsche mark
was. The estimated foreign seigniorage revenue
currently earned by the United States is proba-
bly an upper bound on what the EU can expect
to earn.
Euro notes will include €100,  €200, and
€500 denominations.
17 Currently, the highest
denomination note issued by the Federal
Reserve is the $100 bill. Higher denomination
notes may make the euro an attractive alterna-
tive to the dollar as a store of value in countries
undergoing high inflation. It may also make 
the euro more attractive for transactions in 
the underground economy. The existence of
high-denomination euro notes in and of itself
will not cause individuals who currently hold
dollars as a secure store of value in high-infla-
tion countries or for illicit purposes to immedi-
ately switch to euros. These individuals will 
also have to be convinced that the euro will
retain its value as well as, or better than, the dol-
lar. This, in turn, will depend on the ECB’s track
record in maintaining price stability in the euro
area.
TARGET
The architects of EMU faced a key chal-
lenge in the creation of a payments system that
integrated money markets in all EU countries.
The TARGET system (TARGET stands for Trans-
european Automated Real-time Gross settlement
Express Transfer) consists of fifteen national
real-time gross settlement systems and the ECB
payment mechanism. It provides a uniform plat-
form for processing cross-border payments.
Prior to EMU, payments between EU countries
relied almost exclusively on correspondent
banking arrangements. Since the beginning of
1999, these relationships have declined dramat-
ically, although most banks seem to be main-
taining one or two correspondent accounts for
each euro-area country until the euro notes and
coins are introduced in 2002.
The TARGET system was created, first, to
provide a pan-European payments system that
would integrate national money markets and
support the monetary policy of the ECB, and
second, to safeguard financial markets and insti-
tutions from systemic events. The former was
accomplished by linking the existing national
payments systems. The latter was accomplished
by moving to a real-time gross-settlement stan-
dard for national payments systems prior to
EMU and away from end-of-day settlement, or
netting systems, in which participants accumu-
late large open positions against their counter-
parties.
On January 4, 1999, its first day of opera-
tion, the TARGET system processed about
156,000 payments, with a total value of about
€1.18 trillion. Of these, about 5,000 were cross-
border payments, totaling about €245 billion.
The volume of cross-border payments rapidly
increased to 20,000 to 30,000 a day, with a total
value between €300 billion and €400 billion,
after only a week of operation. The successful
launch of TARGET—and the consolidation of
national money markets—was reflected in the
rapid reduction in interest rate spreads in
overnight money markets in January 1999.
Of the other systems available for process-
ing payments in euros, the three largest are
Euro 1, Euro Access Frankfurt (EAF), and the
Système Net Protégé (SNP) (known since April
1999 as Paris Net Settlement, PNS). There are
also two smaller local systems: Servicio Español
de Pagos Interbancarios (SEPI) in Spain and
Pankkien väliset On-line Pikasiirot ja Sekit
(POPS) in Finland. Together these systems settle
a daily average volume of €400 billion, and the
Euro 1 system (a cooperative undertaking
between EU-based commercial banks and the
EU branches of foreign banks) is by far the most
extensively used alternative to TARGET. The
existence of competitively priced alternative
payments systems caused some concern (see,
for example, Prati and Schinasi 1999) that
TARGET might not attract the volume of high-
value payments needed to significantly con-
tribute to a lowering of payments-system sys-
temic risk. That concern appears to have been
unfounded: through September 1999, the aver-
age value of TARGET payments was €5.8 mil-
lion. The average value of cross-border pay-
ments was €12.9 million, while the average
value of domestic payments was €4.4 million.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 22
The average values of the payments settled by
the three biggest other systems (Euro 1, EAF,
and PNS) were €2.8 million, €3.3 million, and
€4.5 million, respectively.
WHAT ABOUT THE OUTS?
Not all fifteen members of the EU chose to
participate in EMU from the outset. Greece
failed to meet the convergence criteria laid
down in the Maastricht Treaty, while the UK,
Sweden, and Denmark chose to stay out for
domestic political reasons. Greece formally
applied for membership in March and hopes to
become a member at the beginning of next
year. As part of the convergence process, the
Greek drachma was revalued on January 17,
2000. The situation in the UK, Sweden, and
Denmark as to eventual membership in EMU is
less clear.
When the Maastricht Treaty was first put to
a referendum in Denmark, it was decisively re-
jected by the electorate. The treaty was ratified
in a subsequent referendum, but only after it
had been amended to provide an opt-out from
the single currency for Denmark (Protocol No.
12 of the Maastricht Treaty). However, since the
start of EMU the Danish krone has been pegged
to the euro with a ±2.25 percent fluctuation band
under the terms of ERM II, meaning that, in
effect, Danish monetary policy is dictated by the
ECB. The Danish prime minister has already
launched a political campaign to bring Denmark
into EMU, and in September the ruling Social
Democrats will hold a referendum on Denmark’s
entry into EMU.
Although Sweden satisfied all the conver-
gence criteria for participation in EMU, it did not
join at the outset because of domestic
“Euroscepticism.” Some of this skepticism
waned in the closing months of 1998, when
Denmark and Sweden were more adversely
impacted by fallout from the Russian default
than was Finland, which had elected to join
EMU. Over the past year, attitudes in Sweden
have wavered between joining and not joining.
However, in January the ruling Social
Democratic Party announced for the first time
that it formally supports Swedish membership in
EMU.
Which leaves only the UK. The govern-
ment secured an opt-out from EMU when the
Maastricht Treaty was negotiated (Protocol No.
11 of the Maastricht Treaty). With the change of
government in the UK in 1997, official attitudes
toward the EU changed significantly, and the
new Labor government declared its intention to
take the UK into EMU when the time is right. In
late 1997 the UK Treasury announced five eco-
nomic tests that would be used to determine
when the UK should join (see HM Treasury
1997):
1. Are business cycles and economic struc-
tures compatible so that the UK and
other members of EMU could live com-
fortably with a common interest rate on
a permanent basis?
2. If problems emerge, is there sufficient
flexibility to deal with them?
3. Would EMU membership enhance the
attractiveness of the UK to overseas
investors?
4. How would EMU membership affect
the competitive position of the UK’s
financial services industry?
5. Will EMU membership promote higher
growth, stability, and a lasting increase
in jobs?
These tests are sufficiently vague that the
government could easily announce that the tests
are satisfied at any time. The UK took a further
step forward in February 1999 with the publica-
tion of a National Changeover Plan (HM
Treasury 1999) that details how UK membership
in EMU might come about and presents a
timetable for replacing sterling with the euro.
A more binding constraint on UK mem-
bership is the Labor government’s commitment
to put the issue to a referendum. As Figure 6
shows, the UK public remains skeptical about
the single currency, and in the June 1999 elec-
tions to the European Parliament, the anti-euro
Conservative Party won 36 seats, compared with
the Labor Party’s 29 seats. However, while pub-
lic opinion in the UK remains decidedly against
membership in EMU, a significant segment of
British industry believes it is in the UK’s interest
to join. A June 1999 survey of members of the
Institute of Directors revealed that 67 percent
were in favor of the UK joining the single cur-
rency (in principle). In July the Confederation of
British Industry (CBI) announced that it was in
favor of the UK joining EMU. The CBI adopted
a pro-EMU stance after a poll of its members
showed that some 52 percent backed eventual
membership.
18 However, the CBI has subse-
quently announced that it will no longer
actively campaign for UK membership until the
government takes a more active role in promot-
ing the issue.
Opponents of UK membership in EMU
often argue that the UK business cycle is more
closely aligned with the U.S. business cycle than23 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL REVIEW  FIRST QUARTER 2000
with the cycle in continental European countries
and that the criterion of cyclical convergence
will never be satisfied. This fact is documented
by Wynne and Koo (forthcoming), among many
others. They show that the correlation between
the cyclical component of output in the UK and
the United States is 0.67, which exceeds the cor-
relation of UK output with that in France (0.58)
or Germany (0.45). The relative magnitudes are
similar if we look at employment instead of out-
put. However, the relevance of this fact to the
debate about UK membership in EMU is not
obvious. To begin with, we do not fully under-
stand why the UK business cycle is more closely
correlated with the U.S. cycle than with the
cycle in the rest of Europe. The correlation may
reflect the significant volume of trade and
investment flows between the UK and the
United States (most U.S. foreign direct invest-
ment in Europe goes to the UK), or it may be
due to other factors.
These flows, in turn, may be influenced
over time by the UK’s attitude toward EMU. If
the UK were to remain outside EMU perma-
nently, some of these investment flows might
shift to the euro area. Already a number of
Asian investors in the UK have indicated they
will rethink their location choices should the UK
delay for long its decision on EMU membership.
Rose (1999) presents evidence suggesting the
real effects of a monetary union may be sub-
stantial. Specifically, he shows that two coun-
tries that share a common currency tend to
trade three times as much as they would if they
had different currencies. Furthermore, Frankel
and Rose (1998) demonstrate that the closer the
trade links between countries, the more highly
correlated their business cycles are.
OUTLOOK
I noted at the beginning of this article 
that many commentators in the United States
doubted EMU would ever happen or thought
that, if it did, it would be a source of conflict
within the EU and between the EU and the
United States (see Feldstein 1997a,b). The com-
mon thread in the skeptics’ arguments was that
the EU does not constitute an optimum cur-
rency area in the sense of Mundell (1961).
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While there were some differences in economic
performance across the euro area over the past
year, we did not see the kind of dramatic asym-
metries the skeptics believe will cause EMU to
collapse. Despite sluggish growth in two of the
larger economies (Germany and Italy), un-
employment continued to decline across the
euro area, although it does remain at unaccept-
ably high levels. Germany, which accounts for
about one-third of euro-area economic activity,
only experienced one quarter of negative growth
(at the end of 1998) rather than a full-blown
recession. How well the institutions of EMU will
deal with more severely asymmetric cycles if
and when they occur is an open question.
20
In the near term it is also essential that the
EU address the issue of lender of last resort for
the euro area. The ECB has a very limited role
in bank supervision and regulation, and the
Maastricht Treaty does not spell out what
exactly the responsibilities of the ECB are in the
event of a major financial crisis. Article 105 of
the Maastricht Treaty mandates that the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) shall
“promote the smooth operation of the payments
system.” The same article also states that “the
ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of
policies pursued by the competent authorities
relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and the stability of the financial sys-
tem” and that the European Council may confer
upon the ECB specific tasks related to supervi-
sion. Begg et al. (1998) argue that the current
arrangements are unsafe and that there is no
secure mechanism for creating liquidity in the
event of a crisis. Banking supervision remains a
national responsibility, and there are questions
about whether the ECB would have access to
the relevant information to allow it to make
quick decisions if a crisis occurs.
21 The
European Parliament’s Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs (EPCEMA) recently noted
that “…the ESCB’s arrangements for the emer-
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gency provision of liquidity to financial institu-
tions in distress have been called into question
by the International Monetary Fund and by pri-
vate sector observers, and EPCEMA urges the
ESCB to make clear that the necessary proce-
dures for approval and disbursement of such
‘lender of last resort’ facilities are in place and
have been rehearsed.”
In its convergence report prepared as part
of the transition to EMU, the European
Monetary Institute (the forerunner of the ECB)
drew attention to the long-term problems posed
by pay-as-you-go pension systems in the EU.
22
The ECB reiterated this point in its January 2000
Monthly Bulletin, noting that “the ageing of
populations represents a serious challenge to
the sustainability of the pay-as-you-go financed
public pension schemes” in the euro area. To
give some sense of the scale of the problem
faced by the euro-area economy, Figure 7 pre-
sents projections of the number of potential
workers per retired person over the next fifty
years for the United States and the EU.
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The decline in the ratio in the United States
reflects the aging of the baby-boom generation
and is the primary demographic factor fueling
the debate over the long-term sustainability of
the Social Security program here. However, as
Figure 7 shows, the aging problem is more
severe in the EU than in the United States. The
figure presents four variants for the EU. The first
two are for the euro area (EU11) and the current
fifteen members of the EU (EU15). Variant 3
(EU21) shows the projections if the EU expands
to include the six current applicants considered
the most likely candidates for early membership
(Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovenia, and Cyprus). The final variant (EU28)
shows what happens if the EU expands to
include all thirteen of the current applicants (in
addition to the six just mentioned, Latvia,
Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria,
Romania, Malta, and Turkey).
The rapid rise in the dependency ratio
(decline in the number of workers per retiree) in
the EU reflects declining birth rates and
increased longevity. The decline in the birth rate
in three of the largest euro-area economies
(Germany, Italy, and Spain) has been so dra-
matic in recent years that, were it not for immi-
gration, the populations of these countries
would have fallen.
24 The aging of the population
might not be so problematic were it not for the
extensive reliance on publicly funded pensions
in these countries and the relatively generous
nature of these pensions. In Germany, for ex-
ample, workers are entitled to a public pension
equal to 72 percent of their average net lifetime
earnings. Additionally, public expenditure on
health care for the elderly is high and has risen
with recent costly advances in medical technol-
ogy. In short, demographic developments over
the next decades could prove a serious threat to
the fiscal positions of many of the euro-area gov-
ernments that will necessitate painful reforms at
some point. Some changes have recently been
made (France now indexes pensions to prices
rather than wages; Germany switched from
indexing to gross wages to indexing to net
wages), but more remains to be done.
Obviously the aging of the EU population
is independent of whether the countries share a
common currency. Rather, its significance stems
from the institutional framework of EMU and, in
particular, the restrictions on national fiscal poli-
cies as set out in the Maastricht Treaty and elab-
orated upon in the Growth and Stability Pact.
Article 104 of the Maastricht Treaty states
that
1. Member States shall avoid excessive gov-
ernment deficits.
2. The Commission shall monitor the de-
velopment of the budgetary situation and
of the stock of government debt in the
Member States with a view to identifying
gross errors. In particular it shall examine
compliance with budgetary discipline on
the basis of the following two criteria:
(a) whether the ratio of the planned or
actual government deficit to gross domes-
tic product exceeds a reference value….
(b) whether the ratio of government debt
to gross domestic product exceeds a refer-
ence value….
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5. If the Commission considers that an
excessive deficit in a Member State exists
or may occur, the Commission shall
address an opinion to the Council.
6. The Council shall, acting by a qualified
majority on a recommendation from the
Commission…decide after an overall assess-
ment whether an excessive deficit exists.
7. Where the existence of an excessive
deficit is decided…the Council shall make
a recommendation to the Member State
concerned with a view to bringing that sit-
uation to an end within a given period….
9. If a Member State persists in failing to
put into practice the recommendations of
the Council, the Council may decide to
give notice to the Member State to take,
within a specified time-limit, measures for
the deficit reduction which is judged nec-
essary by the Council in order to remedy
the situation….
11. As long as a Member State fails to com-
ply with a decision taken in accordance
with paragraph 9, the Council may decide
to apply or, as the case may be, intensify
one or more of the following measures:
– to require the Member State concerned
to publish additional information, to be
specified by the Council, before issuing
bonds and securities;
– to invite the European Investment bank
to reconsider its lending policy towards
the Member State concerned;
– to require the Member State concerned
to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of
an appropriate size with the Community
until the excessive deficit has, in the view
of the Council, been corrected;
– to impose fines of an appropriate size.
The Growth and Stability Pact adopted at
the Dublin Summit in December 1996 is in-
tended to clarify and strengthen the provisions
of the treaty in regard to excessive deficits by
strengthening fiscal discipline under EMU.
25 The
existence of large, unfunded public pension lia-
bilities will certainly complicate EMU partici-
pants’ ability to abide by the terms of the treaty
and the Growth and Stability Pact.
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CONCLUSIONS
By any reasonable standards, the first year
of EMU must be judged a success. The
changeover weekend went by without incident,
the TARGET payments system was launched
without any major problems, and the ECB has
successfully taken over monetary policy for the
euro area. The ECB faced the first serious chal-
lenge to its independence and effectively de-
fended its status. It also conducted its first pol-
icy moves, easing monetary policy in April in
the face of a growing threat of deflation and
weak real activity in the euro area. In November
it reversed course, tightening policy as the bal-
ance of risks shifted to higher inflation, and the
euro-area recovery took hold.
The success of the first year does not
mean that it will be all plain sailing from here
on. Many challenges remain, and how the EU
and the ECB tackle these will determine the ulti-
mate fate of EMU. One issue highlighted in this
article is the rapidly aging population of the EU.
The aging of the population over the coming
decades in conjunction with generous pension
provisions will put a severe strain on the public
finances of the euro-area economies. One solu-
tion might be to admit large numbers of immi-
grants, but Europe does not have a tradition of
encouraging large-scale immigration. The only
alternative is drastic reform of the public pen-
sion programs in all the countries, something no
government has yet been willing to tackle. More
generally, structural reforms of labor and prod-
uct markets are crucial if the EU is to address
the high unemployment rates and sluggish
growth that have plagued it for the past decade.
Small moves have been made in this direction,
but a lot more needs to be done.
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1 The eleven countries participating in EMU are Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
2 On January 27 the euro closed at below parity for the
first time ($0.9883 in New York).
3 The European Currency Unit (ECU) was a synthetic cur-
rency defined on the basis of a basket of the currencies
of the EU member states. Specifically, on December 31,
1998, one ECU consisted of 3.301 Belgian francs,
0.6242 German marks, 0.1976 Danish krones, 6.885
Spanish pesetas, 1.332 French francs, 0.08784 British
pounds, 1.44 Greek drachmas, 0.008552 Irish punts,
151.8 Italian lira, 0.13 Luxembourg francs, 0.2198
Dutch guilders and 1.393 Portuguese escudos (see
European Central Bank 1999a, 72).FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 26
4 Arguably the first policy action of the ECB was taken 
in December 1998, when the eleven euro-area central
banks (the so-called Eurosystem) coordinated a
reduction in their short-term interest rates to a 
common 3 percent level before the formal launch of
EMU.
5 To this end, in its Monthly Bulletin the ECB publishes sta-
tistics only for the euro area as a whole and not for indi-
vidual member states. Statistical information is provided
on developments in the four EU countries that do not par-
ticipate in EMU (Denmark, Greece, Sweden, and the UK)
and also on developments in the United States and
Japan.
6 Formally, people are counted as unemployed if they are
without work, are available to start work in the next two
weeks, and have actively sought employment at some
point during the previous four weeks.
7 The relative importance of owner’s equivalent rent in the
U.S. CPI as of December 1997 was just over 20 percent.
8 Interestingly, the ECB does not define how long the
“medium term” is.
9 The Maastricht Treaty stipulates that, as one of the
convergence criteria for assessing suitability for EMU
membership, a country’s inflation rate should not
exceed the average rate of the three best performers
by more than 1.5 percentage points.
10 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/.
11 See, for example, the recent working paper by Coenen
and Vega (1999), which builds on other research con-
ducted by the ECB’s predecessor, the European
Monetary Institute.
12 In December 1999, the Governing Council announced
that this value will also be used for 2000.
13 Note also that the president of the ECB has indicated
that none of the decisions to change interest rates
were made by a formal vote.
14 One of the objectives of the Intergovernment
Conference that drew up the Amsterdam Treaty, which
was signed in October 1997, was to enhance the
democratic accountability of EU institutions.
15 The main components of the European Monetary
System, which existed prior to EMU, were the Exchange
Rate Mechanism, which was essentially a system of
fixed exchange rates between the currencies of the par-
ticipating countries, and the European Currency Unit,
which has now been replaced by the euro.
16 Note that the seigniorage revenue will be distributed
among participating countries using a formula pre-
scribed in the Maastricht Treaty Protocol No. 3 on the
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and
the European Central Bank, Articles 29 and 31.
17 The denominational structure of the euro will consist of
coins at the 1, 2, 5, 10, and 20 euro cent denomina-
tions, coins at the €1 and €2 denominations, and
notes at the €5, €10, €20, €50, €100, €200, and €500
denominations.
18 The Economist newspaper surveyed British econo-
mists in early 1999 and found that about 65 percent
favored UK membership in EMU.
19 Ironically, the critics seem to overlook the later papers
by Mundell (1973a,b) in which he proposes additional
criteria for evaluating the suitability of a single cur-
rency for a group of countries. As a result of these
works, he has been referred to in some circles as the
father of the euro. See also Mundell (1998a,b).
20 The studies of Frankel and Rose (1998) and Rose
(1999) just cited are also relevant to this question.
Insofar as sharing a common currency enhances trade
flows within the euro area and these trade flows lead
to more synchronous business cycles, the concern
about asymmetric shocks may prove unfounded.
However, within a monetary union as long-standing
and fully credible as the United States, asymmetric
cycles may occasionally emerge. Through the 1980s
and 1990s different regions of the United States expe-
rienced shocks that caused localized recessions of
varying degrees of severity; the term “rolling reces-
sions” entered policy debates to describe this phe-
nomenon.
21 Prati and Schinasi (1999) articulate similar concerns.
22 See also the recent report by the G-10 (Group of Ten
1998).
23 Specifically, the figure shows the ratio of the popula-
tion aged 25 to 64 to the population aged 65 and
older and is taken from the “medium variant” projec-
tions in United Nations (1998).
24 In its most recent forecasts the United Nations (1998)
projects that the population of Italy will fall from 57.3
million in 2000 to 41.2 million in 2050, that of Germany
from 82.2 million to 73.3 million, and that of Spain from
39.6 million to 30.2 million.
25 For further details see the May 1999 issue of the ECB’s
Monthly Bulletin.
26 The need for fiscal rules under a monetary union is a
contentious issue. Artis and Winkler (1997) argue that
the excessive deficit provisions of the treaty can be
justified on the grounds that under monetary union the
costs of an overly expansionary fiscal policy will be
borne by all members of the monetary union and not
just by the country pursuing the policy, creating an
incentive for countries to be more lax with their fiscal
policy. Bergin (2000), arguing from the perspective of
the fiscal theory of the price level, makes a similar
point.
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